Greg Detre
Tuesday, 26 June, 2001
Mr Paul Snowdon
Philosophy of mind, VIII
explanatory adequacy of physicalism???
same with Heisenberg�s theory
what is explanation??? weak emergent causation
it�s �why� � rely on facts � that�s just the way the world is
irritatingly though, we can�t say a priori where the inexplicable level lies
but I don�t think that the materialist�s explanatory gap is one of causal epistemological weak emergence
candidate for the a priori inexplicable
this is Greg � why is he Greg? because that is Greg, he
there is no explanation
identity is inexplicable � properties, intension???
looking for identities of course to the physical � that just is what consciousness is
why is water H2O?
the identity tells you things, rather than being explicable
do physicalist identities yield explanatory benefit?
correlations, predictive (isn�t explanation - 2-way dissociation)
common-sense causal properties of consciousness
the conscious decision might not be the trigger, so much as the result of the neural processing
the causal dependencies in our cognition needn�t be as they seem
the causal properties of consciousness needn�t be as they seem
Libet � button-pushing
Grey Walter (1963) � slide-projector wired up to motor cortex
Snowdon doesn�t know what you can just say is inexplicable
how do materialists explain why only some (brain) processes give rise to consciousness???
hard-line � that�s inexplicable, e.g. why isn�t Tom Paul???
what does McGinn think we can�t come up with in terms of explanation???
his demands are too high
notion of explanation
difference between the identity of people + objects � people aren�t functional notions
there�s more to Tom than that
why is that mountain Everest??
what needs explaining???
positing dualism restricts the questions you can ask
positive identities simply what you�ve got
why isn�t he Greg � articificial arbitrary boundaries
OR functional definition
big issue for materialism � is there an explanatory gap???
McGinn ≈ Godel of the mind � explanation is beyond us, but physicalism is true
can we say anything to the epiphenomenalist??? panpsychist???
materialist vs panpsychist???
should our priority in philosophy be plausibility, in the sense of making fewest assumptions and easiest to argue???
can you say anything to the Zombie Hunch???
do consciousness/brain share the same properties???
is there anything to Searle???